NOODLING ON GOD

This afternoon I ran across this essay by Greg Perkins on Diana Hsieh's Noodle Food website.  Greg argued that a religious foundation for morality is a God-of-the-gaps fallacy, because the ethical life is scientifically reducible to objective values needed for a person's existence.  He furthered argued that Ayn Rand showed us exactly how this is so, thus closing the last gap we theists have desperately tried to squeeze God into.

There are a number of problems with Greg's argument.  The first is his premise:  >>Morality is objectively valuable to humans because our existence literally depends on it.<<  That's not exactly true.  A person can survive amorally by living like an animal and seizing whatever opportunity there is for food, water, shelter, comfort, and pleasure.  Let's call that the non-human mode of existence.  Worse, a person can live by destroying the lives and livelihood of others to accumulate whatever he desires.  Let's call that the anti-human mode of existence.

Of course, a person could choose to live as human being who thrives by acts of creation not merely to survive but to live a sacred life of beauty.  It is this human mode of existence that necessitates morality.  Diligent students of Rand's philosophy, Objectivism, wouldn't put it that way, but they would agree with its essence.  When Rand wrote that the standard of value for morality is life, she meant more than survival.  She meant life qua man -- that is, life as a human being, not as a clever beast or a destroyer.

So, in fact, both followers of the Judeo-Christian tradition and Objectivists agree not only does morality have an objective foundation, evidence of which is in human nature (as opposed to our baser biological nature as an animal, which in our fallen state can lead us to depravity), they largely agree upon what the foundation is.   Therefore, the second problem with Greg's argument is this strawman:  >>Someone avoiding murdering simply because he is committed to following the commandment that "thou shalt not kill" is not so much against murder as for obeying God; he would likewise obey if he instead thought God wanted him to kill (consider terrorist suicide bombers, or the case of Abraham and Isaac).<<

No doubt many people keep their nose clean to avoid punishment by the authorities.  However, it isn't prudence that restrains a reflective theist (my shorthand here for a Jew or a Christian) from violating God's commandment against murder.  It is his knowledge that a human life is not his to take.  That life is God's creation and God's alone to dispense with.  If a theist is to strive for the epitome of his existence -- his telos -- he will emulate that most perfect being, God, and live as a creator and not as a destroyer.

The Objectivist also knows that the life of another person is not his to take.  But, unlike the theist, all he has is Rand's principle of self-interest to restrain him from murder.  Yet it is not clear how self-interest does this, except maybe prudence -- and that's a weak reed.  All prudence proscribes is the commission of a particular murder, not murder in general.  Because it is within a person's capacity to choose the non-human or the anti-human mode of existence, rather than the human one, self-interest alone offers no guidance as to which self a person should choose and therefore what interests will attach to that choice.

God vested us with a transcendent purpose to be what nothing else in His creation can be:  Creators in our own right.  Because each and every one of us is ensouled with this telos, we can objectively know that the only self we should choose to be is our human self.  Therefore, we can objectively know what conduct is moral and what is not.  We can objectively know why God's commandments are true and why we want to follow them if we want to live a fully human life.  Without God, Nietzsche showed us how ambitious men would be seduced to live as destroyers and how they would reduce the meek to beasts.  Rand's ethic of self-interest, despite her earnest efforts to the contrary, offers no compelling guidance as to why this should not be so.

At best Rand correctly described what the moral life entails, but not why we should choose it.  That's the third problem with Greg's argument:  >>In approaching morality like scientists, we don't reject "traditional values" out of hand, nor do we follow tradition blindly. Instead, we use this bounty of material to identify and refine principles of human action that support our lives.<<  Sure, that can work to identify the values, virtues, and vices of life as a human being.  The evidence of an objective morality can be found in human nature.  But this Objectivist approach only tells us what the principles of the human mode of existence are, not why any of us should make that choice.

Comments

[Francisco Rodriguez]

Hello Mr. Tingley,

The only Objectivist book I've read is "For The New Intellectual", so you'll have to excuse me if I'm mistaken.

"When Rand wrote that the standard of value for morality is life, she meant more than survival. She meant life qua man -- that is, life as a human being, not as a clever beast or a destroyer."

In my opinion this is why Rand failed to bridge the is-ought gap. First she starts by saying man's highest value is life. The first decision he is confronted with is whether he'll choose life and act according to his nature. Then she goes on to say the only rational way to do this is by looking solely at the facts of reality, which are his guide to flourishing during his existence. The problem I see with this is that in the first part of her argument she uses the biological definition of life and all of a sudden switches to "life" as understood by the meaning we give to our life span.

I agree that man has to take into account the facts of objective reality to live a moral life, but her explication is wanting. Later on, it seems to me Rand comes close to a Natural Law approach to ethics, but sunders any relation to it with her principle against coercion, which IMO she stretches so much that it loses any sensible value.

[Bill]

Hello, Francisco.

Before writing this article I reviewed "Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand" as a refresher. It is a handy summary of Rand's philosophy in a single volume.

I think we see the same problem. You don't see how Rand moves from one definition of life (mere animal survival) to another (flourishing as a moral being). I think this is because Rand fails to account for what is that "nature" of man which determines his needs beyond mere survival and therefore his values as a human being.

Rand correctly identifies that a man ought to live his life as a moral being -- in other words, a human being. But she does not say why he should do so, save prudence, instead of choosing to be a Nietzschean superman or a Hobbesian beast -- what I termed as the anti-human and non-human modes of being.

I argue that justifying the choice to live as a human being precedes any discussion of what morality is. I suspect why Rand punted at this point and left the gap you have sensed in her argument is because I don't know how the choice to live as a human being can be justified sans a telos for humankind. The only adequate telos strongly points towards the existence of God, which Rand rejected.

As to your final point, I also saw a great deal of harmony between Randian ethics and natural law, at least as to how a person should conduct himself if not why he should do so.

Regards, Bill

[Jason]

Bill,

I'm an atheist although I dont get upset with believers like so many atheists do. So you can understand why I doubt the idea of a telos for mankind but I hear what you are saying. let me ask this then. Why isnt this telos a person living true to his human nature?

Jason

[Bill]

Hi, Jason.

It is. The evidence of telos is found, in part, in human nature. Other evidence lies in the order and purpose that exists in rest of the universe. It is from this evidence once can induce the existence of a creator who fashioned human beings to be creators in his image.

I can understand how an atheist does not draw the same conclusion from the evidence. But in that case, I have not been able to understand how an atheist bridges the "is-ought" gap. (Unless, of course, he is a materialist and dismisses "ought" as subjective desire or at best prudence.)

Regards, Bill